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 1 Introduction
The vast majority of industrial organizational theory is constructed on a rather sim-
plistic premise that a ﬁrm’s ﬁrst priority is to maximize proﬁts. In practice, how-
ever, ﬁrm managers driven by equity-based incentive packages are more apt to focus
equally on multiple objectives, including proﬁtability, stability of proﬁts, and creating
conditions to foster strong anticipated growth of proﬁts. When viewed through the
objective of equity market valuation, diﬀerent market outcomes, interpretations, and
policy-relevant factors begin to emerge.
This paper investigates the ﬁrm owner’s delegation strategies and manager’s pric-
ing and production decisions building from a model of equity value maximization in
an imperfect diﬀerentiated product market. Beginning with Vickers (1985), Fersht-
man and Judd (1987), and Sklivas (1987), most studies of strategic delegation assume
that the manager’s objective function is based on a linear combination of proﬁts and
product revenue (or its variant, sales), derived from an owner’s objective to maximize
proﬁts in an oligopoly setting. By providing an incentive package, the owners can
manipulate the manager’s behavior, commit to strategies in the product market, and
gain a strategic advantage.
The strategic delegation literature has since branched out signiﬁcantly to cover
various topics of interest, for example, merger incentive (Ziss, 2001; Gonzalez-Maestre
and Lopez-Cunat, 2001; Banal-Estanol and Ottaviani, 2006), multiproduct ﬁrm in-
centive (Barcena-Ruiz and Espinosa, 1999; Moner-Colonques et al., 2004), wage bar-
gaining (Szymanski, 1994; Conlin and Furusawa, 2000), and relative performance
measure (Fumas, 1992; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Miller and Pazgal, 2001, 2005).
While the delegation literature has focused primarily on the equilibrium incentives
through the internal payment scheme, it has provided little guidance as to the proper
1speciﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s objective function.
In this paper, we develop a model of strategic delegation in which shareholders
maintain an objective of market value maximization (MVM) of the ﬁrm’s assets as
measured by a capital asset pricing model (CAPM). In this context, it requires that
managers maximize a linear combination of expected proﬁts and ﬁrm values. An
interesting feature of this model is that optimal delegation contracts of the MVM
objective mitigate competition in both price and quantity games compared with the
results obtained from the stylized proﬁt maximization objective. In the MVM model,
the delegation encourages managers to control systematic risk, which leads to greater
market coordination, higher proﬁts, and higher stock values.
The above result is diﬀerent from what is generally agreed that the delegation
strategy depends critically on knowing the mode of competition in the product mar-
ket. As Fershtman and Judd (1987) among others point out, the owners in the
delegation studies are essentially joint Stackelberg leaders and thus obtain the pris-
oner’s dilemma outcome in the sense that they would be better oﬀ not engaging in
quantity games involving delegation of a market share incentive. On the other hand,
in the case of strategic complements, the delegated incentives work to increase the
owner’s expected proﬁts. Similar conclusions can be drawn from, for example, Eaton
and Grossman (1986) in a strategic trade context, Brander and Lewis (1986) and
Showalter (1995) in the model of strategic capital structure. Departing from Singh
and Vives (1984), Stiegert and Wang (2006) explore the diminishing diﬀerences be-
tween outcomes in quantity and price competitions through advertising. Miller and
Pazgal (2001, 2005) illustrate the equivalence of price and quantity competitions by a
relative performance measure, in which managers are given an incentive scheme based
on a weighted sum of the ﬁrm’s own proﬁt and its rival’s proﬁt. However, knowing the
rival’s proﬁt is diﬃcult in practice. Instead of the relative performance approach, by
2combining own MVM and proﬁt-maximizing objectives, this paper demonstrates that
the disparity of equilibrium outcomes in quantity and price competitions is smaller
with delegation than without delegation in the MVM model and the diﬀerences un-
der diﬀerent modes of competition are far less than those derived from the proﬁt-
maximizing objective only. Given that the products are diﬀerentiated, moreover,
impacts of degree of product diﬀerentiation on delegation and shareholders’ strate-
gic motives in price and quantity games are explored extensively. We show that the
mentioned diﬀerences can be ignored when the products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines a model
of a two-stage game in which the shareholders decide manager’s combined objective
of ﬁrm’s anticipated proﬁt and CAPM-styled value of equity in the ﬁrst period, and
managers compete in either quantity or price in the second period. We compare
quantity-setting and price-setting equilibrium outcomes in three diﬀerent scenarios,
including general MVM, typical MVM, and proﬁt maximization objectives. Conclud-
ing remarks and suggestions for future research are oﬀered in section 3.
2 The Model
A model built on the concept of asset value maximization necessarily involves a frame-
work for dealing with uncertainty. We assume a ﬁnancial market characterized by
the Sharpe-Lintner equilibrium. That is,
E(˜ ri) = r + βi [E(˜ rm) − r], (1)
where r is the risk-free interest rate, E(˜ ri) and E(˜ rm) are expected rates of return of
asset i and market portfolio, respectively, while βi is systematic risk or market risk
deﬁned by Cov(˜ ri, ˜ rm)/V ar(˜ rm). The ﬁrm i’s market value can be obtained by Vi =
e πi/(1 + ˜ ri), where e πi is the stochastic cash ﬂow of net earnings.
3The objective function of MVM ﬁrm can be easily derived. Because e πi = (1+˜ ri)Vi,
E(e πi)
Vi
= 1 + E(˜ ri) = 1 + r +
Cov(˜ ri, ˜ rm)
V ar(˜ rm)
[E(˜ rm) − r]
= 1 + r +
·
E(˜ rm) − r
V ar(˜ rm)
¸
Cov(e πi, ˜ rm)
Vi
. (2)




[E(e πi) − λCov(e πi,e rm)], (3)
where λ is the equilibrium shadow price of market risk reduction, deﬁned by [E(e rm)−
r]/σ2
m and σ2
m = V ar(˜ rm).
The model in this study is essentially a two-stage sequential duopoly game. In
the ﬁrst period, the owners (shareholders) of each ﬁrm delegate the product market
decision to managers by properly arranging a linear combination of the ﬁrm’s antici-
pated proﬁt and the CAPM-styled value of equity. In the second period, the manager
of each ﬁrm decides the quantity to produce or the price to charge in the product
market. Following the setting of strategic delegation, like Vickers (1985), Fershtman
and Judd (1987), and Sklivas (1987), the objective function facing manager i is given
by
Mi = (1 − θi)EΠi + θiVi, (4)
where θi is an incentive parameter chosen by shareholders in ﬁrm i, EΠi = E(e πi)/(1+




[E(e πi) − θiλCov(e πi,e rm)]. (5)
Note that if θi = 1, we observe a full incorporation of the CAPM-styled ﬁnancial
objectives. It turns out that equation (1) facing the managers in the general MVM
1In general, the manager’s objective function should be A+B×Mi, where A and B are constant
and B > 0. Both A and B are irrelevant to the product market decisions.
4framework can be rewritten as
E(˜ ri) = r + θiβi [E(˜ rm) − r], (6)
where θi may be interpreted as to how the market risk is actually priced by share-
holders in ﬁrm i relative to the standard CAPM framework in which θi = 1.
Assume that each ﬁrm faces uncertain demand and the same constant marginal
cost (c) is known with certainty. Both ﬁrms’ revenues are subject to a random shock
that neither can observe when the strategic variables are chosen. As a result, ﬁrm i’s
total revenue is given by
˜ Ri = piXi(1 + ˜ e),E(˜ e) = 0,V ar(˜ e) = σ
2
e, (7)
where pi is the price and the random variable ˜ e is an idiosyncratic shock on the
revenue of ﬁrm i. Without loss of generality, it is assumed to have mean of zero. σe
is the standard deviation of the shock. It is further assumed for every demand curve
that the support of the noise is small enough so that negative revenue never occurs.
Thus, the expected net earnings is
E(e πi) = E [piXi(1 + ˜ e)] − Xic = piXi − Xic.
Moreover, because Cov(e πi, ˜ rm) = Cov(˜ e, ˜ rm)piXi,
Vi =









where certainty equivalent φ = 1−λCov(˜ e, ˜ rm) = 1−λρσeσm and ρ is the correlation
coeﬃcient between the revenue shock and the return on market portfolio. In general,
φ ∈ [0,1] and d = c/φ adjusted marginal cost, provided that φ  = 0.2 To keep the
model as concise as possible, we focus on the positive ρ.
2We may incorporate cost uncertainty in equation (8) by deﬁning ψ as a certainty equivalent
parameter on the cost side. For a strictly convex cost function, ψ > 1. After redeﬁning d = cψ/φ,
equation (8) still holds true as long as two sources of uncertainty are independent of each other. The
new adjusted marginal cost is higher than the original one. However, because we assume the cost
function is linear, we need not adjust the cost uncertainty.




, where φi = 1 − θiλρσeσm, and di = c/φi. (9)
To simplify the analysis and rule out possible counter-intuitive results, we focus on
the case that θi < 1/(λρσeσm) and λρσeσm  = 0.
Suppose further that ﬁrms face a linear inverse demand function3 given by (10)
in the product market.
pi = α − bXi − γXj, b ≥ γ ≥ 0, i,j = 1,2, i  = j. (10)
γ ≥ 0 implies directly the case of substitutes and b ≥ γ implies that the own eﬀect
(b) is at least as large as the cross eﬀect (γ). In addition, we assume α > d.
We also deﬁne δ = γ/b to model the degree of (horizontal) product diﬀerentiation.4
The more diﬀerentiated the products (δ ↓), the smaller the eﬀect of change in quantity
(price) of brand j on the price (quantity) of brand i. Note that by assumption
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Therefore, (10) can be rewritten as
pi = α − b(Xi + δXj), 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, i,j = 1,2, i  = j. (11)
Before we proceed further analyses, lemma 1 is very useful to determine the range
of θ.
Lemma 1. (a) di R d ⇐⇒ θi R 1 and (b) di R c ⇐⇒ θi R 0.
Proof. By deﬁnition, di = d ⇐⇒ θi = 1 and di = c ⇐⇒ θi = 0. By assumptions












lemma 1 is proved.
3See also Dixit (1979), Singh and Vives (1984), and Vives (1999).
4Note that the deﬁnition here diﬀers from the common setting seen in, for example, Shy (1995).
6By the one-to-one mapping for θi and di, Lemma 1 allows us to focus on the
adjusted marginal cost di. We may easily characterize the properties of incentive
parameter θi via a simple transformation from di.
The product markets are assumed to be under both price and quantity compe-
titions. The two-stage game is solved by backward induction. We ﬁrst explore the
quantity competition.
Quantity Competition
Under quantity competition, managers in both ﬁrms choose quantity strategies si-
multaneously, taking each other’s strategy as a given. In the second period, manager




Xi(pi − di) =
φi
1 + r
Xi [α − b(Xi + δXj) − di]. (12)
Taking a derivative with respect to Xi and rearranging yield




Equation (13) implicitly deﬁnes manager i’s reaction function. Impacts of an in-
crease in di under quantity competition are depicted in Figure 1(a). As we can see,
MVM delegation strategies mitigate competition relative to the traditional Cournot
benchmark. Similarly, we can get manager j’s reaction function. Solving for optimal
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α(2 − δ) + (2 − δ
2)di + δdj
(2 + δ)(2 − δ)
. (14)














α(2 − δ) − 2di + δdj
b(2 + δ)(2 − δ)
¸·
α(2 − δ) + (2 − δ
2)di + δdj




7The reaction function5 for shareholders in ﬁrm i is
4(2 − δ
2)di + δ
3dj = (2 − δ)
£
2(2 + δ)d − αδ
2¤
. (16)
We may write equilibrium di in quantity competition as
d
c =
2(2 + δ)d − αδ
2
4 + 2δ − δ
2 = d −
(α − d)δ
2
4 + 2δ − δ
2. (17)










2)α + 2(1 + δ)d








(4 + 2δ − δ
2)2.
We are interested in the range of θ in the current quantity competition. As a
result, proposition 1 follows.
Proposition 1. (a) θ
c ≤ 1.
(b) θ




2(2 + δ)(1 − φ) + φδ
2 ≡ c. (18)
Proof. (a) By subtracting d from dc, we get
d
c − d =
−(α − d)δ
2
4 + 2δ − δ
2 ≤ 0,
because α > d and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Since dc ≤ d, by lemma 1(a), θ
c ≤ 1.
(b) To get θ
c ≥ 0, we need dc ≥ c by lemma 1(b). Thus,
d
c − c = d
c − d + (1 − φ)d =
−(α − d)δ
2
4 + 2δ − δ
2 + (1 − φ)d
=
1










≥ 0, by condition in (18).
5The choice variable should be θi. However, as proved in lemma 1, di is increasing monotonically
in θi as long as θi  = 1/(λρσeσm).
8Proposition 1 demonstrates that managers are given incentive contracts empha-
sizing both ﬁrm values and expected proﬁts in the quantity competition, and the
incentive parameter depends on the marginal cost-demand intercept ratio (c/α). By
proposition 1(b), the minimal cost c for θ
c ≥ 0 depends on the degree of product
diﬀerentiation provided that all other parameters stay the same. As shown in Figure
2, the more diﬀerentiated the product (δ ↓), the less minimal cost (c ↓) required;
i.e., ∂c/∂δ ≥ 0. For the cases that c < c, we have θ
c < 0 and the shareholders do
not appreciate ﬁrm’s market value; instead, they direct more emphasis toward the
proﬁts. If production costs are too low, shareholders may not care about the risk
component λCov(e πi,e rm), the diﬀerence between the expected proﬁt and ﬁrm’s mar-
ket value. That is, the cost of risk is negligibly small in this case. When the products
are less diﬀerentiated (δ ↑) and market is more competitive, the managers are stimu-
lated to be more aggressive by being assigned a small or even negative θ. For a given
production cost, therefore, the managers may have a positive (negative) θ when the
product is more (less) diﬀerentiated. We will assume that (18) holds throughout the
paper and therefore 0 ≤ θ
c ≤ 1.
Impacts of degree of product diﬀerentiation on optimal delegation are examined
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. ∂θ
c/∂δ ≤ 0, ∂dc/∂δ ≤ 0, ∂Xc/∂δ ≤ 0, ∂pc/∂δ ≤ 0, and ∂V c/∂δ ≤ 0.
Proof. By ∂di/∂θi > 0, for ∂θ
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(4 + 2δ − δ
2)3 ≤ 0.
By rewriting (11), pi = α − b(Xi + δXj) = (α − bδXj) − bXi. It implies that
as the product becomes more diﬀerentiated (δ ↓), the residual demand facing ﬁrm
i increases, which leads to more emphasis on MVM objective, more output, higher
price, and higher ﬁrm value. Proposition 2 is straightforward because the product
market is less competitive when the product is more diﬀerentiated.
Let us deﬁne equilibrium quantity, price, and ﬁrm value under stylized equilibrium









































{φα − [(2 − φ) + (1 − φ)δ]c}
(2 + δ)2 .
Now, holding the diﬀerentiation parameter constant, comparing equilibrium quantity,
price, and ﬁrm value in three diﬀerent scenarios leads to proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Suppose that (18) holds, Xc
m ≤ Xc ≤ Xc
p, pc
m ≥ pc ≥ pc
p, and
V c
m ≥ V c ≥ V c
p .










































e = dc,d, and c for θ = θ
c,1, and 0, respectively. For quantity and price, it
is easy to see ∂Xc
e/∂dc
e < 0 and ∂pc
e/∂dc
e > 0. By proposition 1, we have d ≥ dc ≥ c.
Therefore, Xc
m ≤ Xc ≤ Xc
p and pc
m ≥ pc ≥ pc
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e − d)]






> 0, for d
c






Because d ≥ dc ≥ c, we have d
c
e ≥ d ≥ dc ≥ c. This completes the proof.
Proposition 3 shows that when shareholders maximize ﬁrm’s market values, op-
timal delegation mitigates product market competition in a quantity-setting game
compared with the results obtained from the stylized proﬁt maximization objective;
that is, Xc ≤ Xc
p, pc ≥ pc
p, and V c ≥ V c
p . Another interesting feature of the model
emerges in the comparison of stylized MVM (θ = 1) with optimal delegation (θ = θ
c).
Here, optimal delegation leads to a more competitive outcome. The story here paral-
lels that of Fershtman and Judd (1987) (and also Eaton and Grossman, 1986), which
we discuss in the concluding comments of this section.
Price Competition





[α(1 − δ) − pi + δpj]. (21)










[α(1 − δ) − pi + δpj](pi − di). (22)
As a result, manager i’s reaction function in price competition is
2pi − δpj = α(1 − δ) + di. (23)
11Impacts of an increase in di on reaction functions are depicted in Figure 1(b). Solving
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. (24)
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b(1 − δ
2)(2 + δ)(2 − δ)
¸·
α(1 − δ)(2 + δ) + 2di + δdj




The reaction function for shareholders in ﬁrm i is
4(2 − δ
2)di − δ
3dj = α(1 − δ)(2 + δ)δ
2 + (2 − δ
2)(4 − δ
2)d. (26)
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2)(2 − δ)d
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2 = d +
(α − d)(1 − δ)δ
2
4 − 2δ − δ
2 . (27)
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2(1 − δ)(2 − δ
2)
(1 + δ)(4 − 2δ − δ
2)2.
From (27) we have proposition 4.
Proposition 4. θ
b ≥ 1.
Proof. By (27) and assumptions that α > d and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, we have
d
b − d =
(α − d)(1 − δ)δ
2
4 − 2δ − δ
2 ≥ 0.
Together with lemma 1(a), θ
b ≥ 1.
12Under price competition, those managers pursuing proﬁt maximization are pe-
nalized (1 − θ
b ≤ 0). The overcompensation for ﬁrm’s market value (θ
b ≥ 1) can
be interpreted as shareholders tax on the manager through the risk-bearing. The
tax disciplines the manager and prevents him from being too aggressive in his pric-
ing strategy (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). From (6) and proposition 4, furthermore,
shareholders overprice the market risk and mitigate price competition in the product
market by setting a large θ.
Similar to proposition 2, we have proposition 5.
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(1 − δ)[3 + (1 − δ
2)2] + δ
3ª
(1 + δ)2 ¡
4 − 2δ − δ
2¢3 ≤ 0.
Proposition 5 shows that the product market is less competitive when the product
is more diﬀerentiated (δ ↓). Unlike ∂Xc/∂δ ≤ 0, ∂Xb/∂δ is negative with small δ, but
positive with large δ.6 This implies that under price competition, managers will seek
to produce less as products become more diﬀerentiated in a relatively homogeneous
product market (large δ). When products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated to begin with,
managers will react to greater diﬀerentiating by increasing output and raising price.
While we have no conclusion on ∂db/∂δ (or ∂θ
b/∂δ), the diﬀerence (db −d or θ
b −1),
which can be interpreted as shareholders’ strategic motives, varying with δ has some
6This U-shaped relationship of Xb and δ can be seen by examining ﬁrm i’s residual demand in
equation (21) as well.
13interesting implications. We will investigate more on this feature under quantity and
price competitions in proposition 7.
Let us deﬁne equilibrium quantity, price, and ﬁrm value under stylized equilibrium









































[φ(1 − δ)α − (2 − φ − δ)c]
(1 + δ)(2 − δ)2 .
By comparing equilibrium quantity, price, and ﬁrm value in three diﬀerent scenarios,
we have proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Xb ≤ Xb
m ≤ Xb
p, pb ≥ pb
m ≥ pb
p, and V b ≥ V b
m ≥ V b
p .
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e = db,d, and c for θ = θ
b,1, and 0, respectively. For quantity and price, it is
easy to see ∂Xb
e/∂db
e < 0 and ∂pb
e/∂db
e > 0. Thus, from proposition 4 and d ≥ c, we
have Xb ≤ Xb
m ≤ Xb
p and pb ≥ pb
m ≥ pb
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2(4 − 2δ − δ
2)
≥ 0.
This completes the proof.
Proposition 6 shows that similar to the results in quantity competition: when
shareholders maximize ﬁrm’s market values, optimal delegation mitigates product
market competition in a price-setting game compared with the results obtained from
the stylized proﬁt maximization objective; that is, Xb ≤ Xb
p, pb ≥ pb
p, and V b ≥ V b
p .
Optimal delegation mitigates competition even more than stylized MVM (θ = 1). The
shareholders have even higher ﬁrm value (V b ≥ V b
m) by delegating product market
decision to managers and the delegation gain for shareholders is (V b − V b
m) because
the choice variable, price in the product market is a strategic complement. See Figure
1(b) for more details.
Comparison of Quantity and Price Competitions
In this section we compare strategic motives of shareholders and equilibrium outcomes
under quantity and price competitions. In the discussion of proposition 5, we mention
that (db − d) can represent shareholders’ strategic motives and this implication can
be extended to the case of quantity competition. If there exist no strategic concerns,
intuitively, the MVM shareholders will select adjusted marginal cost d by setting
θ = 1 for either quantity or price competition. By subtracting d from dc or db, we
can measure the intensity of shareholders’ strategic motives to manipulate mangers’
product market decisions. Proposition 7 examines how shareholders’ strategic motives
vary with the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Proposition 7. Shareholders have no strategic motives when (1) δ = 0 (monopoly,
quantity and price competitions coincide), and (2) δ = 1 (standard Bertrand compe-
15tition). However, shareholders have strongest strategic motives when δ = 1 (standard
Cournot competition).
Proof. From (17) and (27), we have
∆
c(δ) ≡ d
c − d =
−(α − d)δ
2





2δ(4 + δ)(α − d)
¡




b − d =
(α − d)(1 − δ)δ
2









4 − 2δ − δ
2¢2 .(31)
For δ ∈ [0,1], ∆c is monotonically decreasing in δ and ∆c(0) = 0 and ∆c(1) = −(α−
d)/5 from (30). From (31), ∆b(0) = ∆b(1) = 0. Note that ∆c(0) = ∆b(0) = ∆b(1) = 0
for cases of no strategic motives as dc = d and db = d. Moreover, we know that ∆b
and ∂∆b/∂δ are continuous and diﬀerentiable in domain [0,1], ∂∆b(0+)/∂δ > 0 and
∂∆b(1)/∂δ < 0. Thus, there exists at least one maximum. Though it is available for
an analytical solution to max
δ
∆b(δ), ∀δ ∈ [0,1], we only present it numerically for
the illustrative purpose. The maximal ∆b is 0.0731(α−d) when δ = 0.778, which can
be referred to Figure 3. It turns out that |∆c(1)| > |∆b(0.778)|.
The graphs of ∆c(δ) and ∆b(δ) are depicted in Figure 3. When δ = 0, the product
markets are separate, each ﬁrm is a monopolist in its own market, and quantity and
price decisions coincide. In this case, shareholders have no incentives to act strate-
gically and all they need to do is have managers to maximize ﬁrm’s market values.
The interesting case is that when products are homogeneous (δ = 1), shareholders
have opposite strategies under quantity and price competitions. For the case of ho-
mogeneous products, we arrive at standard Cournot and Bertrand competitions. The
standard Bertrand outcome is essentially a perfect competition, and therefore, share-
holders have no incentives to deviate from the typical MVM objective. However,
in the standard Cournot competition, we have shown that shareholders have most
strategic concerns, in which the diﬀerence (dc − d) is largest.
16We further compare the equilibrium outcomes under diﬀerent modes of com-
petition. By looking at propositions 3 and 6, we have no conclusion on compar-




p ) and general MVM price competition (i.e., Xb,pb,V b) because they depend
on the certainty equivalent measure φ. For a large φ, it is more competitive in the
general MVM price game and more likely to get Xc
p ≤ Xb, pc
p ≥ pb, and V c
p ≥ V b.
In what follows, instead, we are interested in the comparison of delegation equilibria
under quantity and price competitions.
Proposition 8. Xc ≤ Xb, pc ≥ pb, and V c ≥ V b.
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2)2(4 − 2δ − δ
2)2 ≥ 0.
(32)-(34) complete the proof.
Proposition 8 shows that the delegation price competition is more competitive
than the delegation quantity competition, though the former is less competitive than
the stylized MVM game from proposition 6. Together propositions 3 and 6 with 8,
we have Xc
m ≤ Xc ≤ Xb ≤ Xb
m, pc
m ≥ pc ≥ pb ≥ pb
m, and V c
m ≥ V c ≥ V b ≥ V b
m.
The diﬀerences of equilibria between quantity and price competitions are smaller
17under optimal delegation. From proposition 8, we also notice that the diﬀerences
decrease rapidly when the products are more diﬀerentiated and these diﬀerences are
not important if the products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.
In Fershtman and Judd (1987), the shareholders’ objective is to maximize proﬁts
leading to a delegation strategy of a linear combination of proﬁts and revenues. The
result is that under quantity competition the ﬁrm is actually worse oﬀ relative the
standard Cournot outcome, while it is better oﬀ under price competition. Their
ﬁnding ushered in the critique about the sensitivity of these models to the mode
of conduct. However, in the current MVM framework, where managers maximize a
linear combination of ﬁrm values and expected proﬁts, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ under both
quantity and price competitions relative to the results with the proﬁt maximization
objective. We further show that the diﬀerences of delegation equilibrium outcomes
under diﬀerent modes of competition can be ignored when the products become more
diﬀerentiated. It suggests that concerns about identifying the mode of competition
have been overstated in the literature.
3 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we developed a model of equity value maximization that allows share-
holders to manipulate manager’s incentives by strategically arranging manager’s ob-
jective scheme in a duopoly framework. In a two-stage setting, the shareholders
decide manager’s combined objective of ﬁrm’s anticipated proﬁts and CAPM-styled
ﬁrm values in the ﬁrst stage, and managers compete in either quantity or price in the
second stage. This study makes several interesting ﬁndings.
First, according to equation (6), incentive parameter θ represents how the market
risk is actually priced by shareholders relative to the standard CAPM framework. In
18propositions 1 and 4, optimal delegation contracts of the MVM objective imply that
the market risk is less priced (0 ≤ θ
c ≤ 1) under the quantity competition, but over
priced (θ
b ≥ 1) under the price competition. The shareholders encourage managers
to control market risk through delegation.
Second, impacts of degree of product diﬀerentiation on optimal delegation are
examined in propositions 2 and 5. In general, the product market is less competi-
tive when the product is more diﬀerentiated. While the product diﬀerentiation has
monotonic inﬂuences on the incentive parameter, quantity produced, price charged,
and ﬁrm value in quantity competition; however, it only has the same eﬀects on
price and ﬁrm value in price competition. The impacts of diﬀerentiation on incentive
parameter and quantity are complicated under price competition.
Third, propositions 3 and 6 compare equilibrium quantity, price, and ﬁrm value
in three diﬀerent scenarios, including MVM delegation, stylized CAPM (θ = 1),
and proﬁt maximization (θ = 0) for both quantity and price games. The results
indicate that strategic delegation of the MVM objective mitigates competition in
both price and quantity games compared with the results obtained from the typical
proﬁt maximization objective. By manipulating the incentive parameter and allowing
managers to control the market risk, the optimal delegation leads to greater market
coordination, higher proﬁts, and higher stock values.
Fourth, we explore the diﬀerences between delegation equilibrium outcomes under
quantity and price competitions. The intensity of shareholders’ strategic motives to
manipulate mangers’ product market decisions is explored in proposition 7. While
there exist no strategic motives in the monopoly case, where quantity and price
decisions coincide; an interesting case occurs when products are homogeneous. In
the homogeneous product market, shareholders have no incentives to deviate from
the typical MVM objective in the standard Bertrand competition, but have strongest
19incentives in the standard Cournot competition. In addition, we also demonstrate that
the delegation price competition is more competitive than the delegation quantity
competition in proposition 8. The disparity of equilibrium outcomes in quantity
and price games is smaller with delegation than without delegation. We further
show that the mentioned diﬀerence can be ignored when the products are suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated. It implies that delegating optimally is more important than knowing
the modes of competition in the product market.
There are some interesting extensions for future research on strategic delegation
in the MVM framework. Without delegation, Stiegert and Wang (2006) explore the
endogenous determination of degree of product diﬀerentiation through advertising. It
is worth working on the delegation case. Furthermore, the theories presented in this
paper can be tested empirically. An application of strategic delegation under price
competition in the MVM framework is the focus of a companion study on the U.S.
margarine and butter markets (Wang, Stiegert, and Dhar, 2006).
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Figure 2:  Marginal Cost-Demand Intercept Ratio (c/α) vs. Degree of Product 
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